The article provides a comparative historical analysis of two systems of study, implementation and dissemination of experience in the Armed Forces (Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army) of the Soviet Union during the Second World War on the Eastern Front (1941–1945) and the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the Anti-Terrorist Operation (April 2014–April 2018). Investigating the transformation of the main components of both systems in military conditions, conclusions were drawn about the key factors that determined the similarities and differences in the reform of organizational structures, processes and means of learning, implementation and dissemination of experience in the Red Army and the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The relevance of the conducted comparative military-historical research is determined by the leading role of the processes of studying and implementing lessons and best practices in ensuring the effective use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to repel Russian armed aggression. The need to fulfill the scientific and practical task is determined by the insufficient attention of the Ukrainian historians to research on the above issue.

Keywords: study, implementation and dissemination of experience, Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, Armed Forces of Ukraine, historical experience, Second World War, Russian-Ukrainian War.

Introduction. Historical experience shows that for any community or organisation to be successful in a particular area, including the military, it is not enough to organize knowledge acquisition, management, dissemination and transformation at the collective level. Especially in military affairs in wartime, it is necessary to perform these processes in the most effective way to adapt the armed forces to strategic, operational and tactical needs as soon as possible, introducing innovations and best practices.

Organisational (collective) learning was, is and will be a driving force behind the evolutionary development of the armed forces, one of the fundamental tools that can ensure the efficiency of training and employment of troops. In the military domain the term ‘organisational learning’ can be defined as formal processes by which a military organisation (e.g., armed forces, service, branch, unit, etc.) applies new knowledge based on experiences or research to adjust its training and employment (institutional doctrines and procedures) in order to minimize the risks of repeating mistakes, increase the chances of achieving success and victories in the future (Dyson, T. 2019).

The organisational learning in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (UAF) functioned from December 1991 to December 2018 in the form of the «System of Lessons Analysis and Dissemination» (SLAD). This system was inherited from the Soviet Armed Forces and was described as a set of methods and techniques for using prescribed structure, process and tools to execute the knowledge acquisition, management and dissemination (Pashchuk, Yu. 2021).

In accordance with the geopolitical changes and permanent reforming of the UAF, three main stages of the SLAD’s performance should be distinguished: 1) Stagnation (December 1991–May 2013); 2) Reformation (May 2013–April 2014); 3) Adaptation (April 2014–December 2018) (Pashchuk, Yu. 2021). The third stage was determined by the beginning of the Antiterrorist Operation (ATO), which was aimed at countering the employment of the illegal Russian and pro-Russian military formations in eastern Ukraine.
According to the neorealist theory, a competitive international security environment, and above all, a threat of defeat in war, should be powerful incentives for the development of organisational learning (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022). The Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine, which has been ongoing since 2014, has become the main factor and catalyst for the radical SLAD’s transformation in wartime (Pashchuk, Yu. 2021). First of all, the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, characterized by the rapid, mobile nature of combat operations and unsatisfactory readiness of the Ukrainian troops to wage a hybrid war, led to huge changes in the UAF military learning. The main SLAD’s focus was to study the combat experiences during the ATO (13 April 2014–30 April 2018). In January 2019, due to poor performance the SLAD was replaced by a perspective Lessons Learned System, which was formed on the basis of the SLAD with implementation of the NATO’s lessons learned best practices (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022). Despite the urgent need to use the SLAD’s historical experiences to build the effective Lessons Learned System, the study of the preliminary system is still neglected by the Ukrainian scientists. In addition, it is important to perform a comparative historical analysis of the SLAD’s performance during the ATO with the practice of other organisational learning systems in wartime.

On the other hand, for almost 80 years, the main aspects of the paradigm of creation and transformation of the organisational learning in the Soviet Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Red Army) during World War II (WWII) have been the objects of the special research abroad and in Ukraine. A significant contribution to these studies was made by the Ukrainian scholars, among whom it is worth noting B. Semon and O. Skriabin (Semon, B.Y. & Skriabin, O.L. 2014), as well as V. Hrytsiu and I. Yevsieiev (Hrytsiuk, V.M. & Yevsieiev, I.G. 2020).

During the WWII on the Eastern Front (1941–1945) the Red Army implemented forming of the «System for Learning Experiences and their Sharing within Troops» (SLEST) (Ivanov, D.A., Saveliev, V.P. & Shemansky, P.V. 1977, s. 358–370), which functioned in the Soviet Armed Forces until 1991. Since the SLAD took over almost all SLEST’s strengths and weaknesses, to draw historical parallels in performance of these two systems in wartime is a reasonable scientific and practical task. The relevance of the study is characterized by the context of ongoing full-scale Russian armed aggression and determined by the need to improve the effectiveness of organisational learning in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The aim of the paper is to complete the military-historical study of organisational learning in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army of the Soviet Union during the Second World War on the Eastern Front (1941–1945) and the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the Anti-Terrorist Operation (2014–2018).

Methods. To analyse the activities of both above forms of organisational learning, it is proposed to apply a systematic approach in four areas: 1) lessons learned (LL) structure; 2) LL process; 3) LL training; 4) LL tools (The NATO Lessons Learned. 2022, p. 9). The main objectives of the analysis are to determine the level of readiness of these systems to operate in wartime, the key features of their transformations during the armed conflicts. At the same time, we should assume that the differences in the studied historical periods, in the scale and nature of the wars, in the number of the personnel, quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment in the Red Army and UAF, as well as other factors did not affect the results of this research.

Findings and analysis. Readiness of the organisational learning systems (SLEST and SLAD) to operate in wartime. De facto, before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 the Red Army lacked a coherent system of organisational learning, and only some LL components were functioning. At the strategic level there were temporarily appointed commissions for studying of experiences and the Military History Department at the Red Army General Staff (GS), which conducted military-historical research on armed conflicts (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 695). Such an approach did not ensure the achievement of the main goal of LL processes – effective acquisition and implementation of lessons learned and best practices. Despite that the initial phase of the WWII (1939–1941) for the USSR was not ‘peaceful’ (formally neutral Soviet Union participated in several military conflicts), the Red Army in June 1941 did not issue any LL doctrinal documents describing the formal LL procedures, LL bodies and their functions.

In contrast to the above situation, Ukraine after gaining its independence in 1991 was in a ‘peaceful environment’ until 2014. However, this period can be characterized as the permanent destruction of the UAF, which was accompanied by the SLAD’s stagnation. Eventually, during this time there was a significant destruction of the centralized LL structure and semiformal LL process that were inherited from the Soviet Armed Forces (Pashchuk, Yu. 2021).
It should be noted that shortly before the ATO, there were some attempts to reform the SLAD. For example, on 27 January 2014 the UAF leadership held a working meeting which resulted in the following decisions (Bidnyi, V. 2021, s. 152–153).

- to appoint the Military Scientific Department (MSD) of the UAF GC responsible for organizing LL process at UAF and to create a LL Section within the MSD (2 officers),
- to form the relevant LL bodies on the basis of scientific research institutions (SRI) and create the Centre for Operational Standards and Methods of Training (COSMTT),
- create an Interactive Electronic Lessons Learned Database (IELLD).

According to the decision of the meeting, there were no plans to restore the centralized LL structure, assign LL bodies’ authorities, develop LL doctrine and standard operating procedures (SOP). Moreover, even the above measures were not fully implemented due to the further Russia’s annexation of Crimea and armed aggression in eastern Ukraine. Thus, at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014 the level of SLAD’s readinessness was also unsatisfactory, as was the state of SLEST’s readinessness to the beginning of the WWII on Eastern front.

**Lessons Learned Structure.** After the beginning of the Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army leadership had to respond to the challenges of the war and radically improve the organisational learning, in particular, to form a centralized LL structure, first at the strategic level and later at other levels of the military hierarchy. According to the Directive of the State Defence Committee on 28 July 1941, the Operational Department at the Red Army GS was designated as the main body responsible for the final generalised lessons learned analysis and sharing (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 698). In April 1942, a Group for using of war (combat) experiences was formed in the Operational Department (GS) and became the first LL body in the Red Army manned with Lessons Learned Staff Officers (LLSO). In addition, the regular LL bodies were created in the central departments of the People’s Commissariat of Defence (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 698).

The pioneer in creating the LL structure at the operational level and below was Lieutenant General M. Vatutin who established a Section of learning of combat experience in the Operational Department of the North-Western Front Headquarters (HQ) in July 1941 (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 702). In the spring of 1942, all Red Army HQs at the strategic and operational levels incorporated the LL bodies manned with LLPOs. The operational branches at the fronts and armies’ HQs were staffed by the LL senior assistants (LL assistants) to the heads of these branches. In addition, mobile lessons learned teams (MLLT) began to operate in the military formations. These teams included the representatives of the Red Army GS: 2 officers – in the army corps, 3 officers – in the army or front (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 702). The main purpose of MLLTs was to provide qualified verification of the initial reports on the studies of operations and conduct a qualitative analysis of observations. In addition, at the end of 1942, some HQs began to involve the LL Points of Contact (POC) into the LL process.

While at the beginning of 1943, regular LL bodies at the strategic and operational levels were already operating, at the tactical level only «some commanders of military formations and units on their own initiative appointed LL POCs among staff officers» (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 709). In October 1943, this issue was discussed at the First Army Lessons Learned Conference. As a result, at the end of 1943 the LL structure was expanded at higher levels and the unified LL bodies were created at the tactical level: in regiments – appointed staff officers as LL POCs, in battalions and below – commanders personally. The final creation of the centralized LL structure, which did not undergo significant changes until the end of the WWII, and, in fact, the ultimate formation of the integral SLEST was completed after establishing the Department for using of war (combat) experiences at the Red Army GS according to the order of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defence on 8 March 1944 (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 710).

Just like the radical transformation of the organisational learning in the Red Army during WWII, the war against Ukraine launched by Russia in 2014 accelerated reforming of the organisational learning in the UAF and forced their leadership to take fundamental measures to adapt the SLAD to the war needs. One of the main priorities in improving this system was the creation of centralized LL structure in the ATO zone.

To increase the efficiency of collecting and analysing observations, a LL Section (LLS), the first
in the UAF LL body manned by the LL POCs, was created in the ATO HQ on 3 August 2014 (Bidnyi, V. 2021, p. 153). The Section consisted of 2-3 officers appointed on a rotational basis for 4 to 8 months. Later, in June 2015 this LL body was reorganized into the Lessons Learned and Training Group (LLTG), which included a LLS (3 officers) (Naukovo-doslidna robota, shyfr «Dosvid-A». 2018). At the same time, the LL Sections were created in all ATO Sector HQs. However, until 2019 the formation of LL bodies at the tactical level was not defined by any doctrinal document, so only some military units (MU) were manned by the LL POCs. One of the main problems in employing of the LL bodies was that their personnel was not trained to perform the assigned functions and was often ‘distracted’ from the implementation of the LL process (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022).

Like the MLLTs in the Red Army, the UAF also used mobile lessons learned teams to study the ATO experiences. These groups were formed by the decision of the UAF leadership and consisted of representatives of the UAF GS and other command and control bodies. They also included experts from the SRIs and professional military educational institutions (PMEI). Their main task was to provide prompt and qualified analysis of combat experiences visiting the ATO zone or locations of MUs after their withdrawal from the combat areas (Naukovo-doslidna robota, shyfr «Dosvid-A». 2018).

Thus, while the Red Army created the unified centralized LL structure at all levels at the end of 1943, approximately 2.5 years after the beginning of the Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, the UAF leadership for the entire period of the ATO (2014–2018) formed a similar LL structure only in the ATO zone at the operational and strategic levels.

**Lessons Learned Process.** The beginning of both studied wars was characterized by a rapid, significant increase in the number of observations and the amount of information about the combat experiences. On the other hand, in the initial phases of these armed conflicts, due to the lack of doctrinal documents the LL processes in the Red Army and UAF were not properly organized. As a result, both organisational learning systems demonstrated unsatisfactory collection of potential observations and poor quality of the LL analysis.

Under these circumstances, the Red Army initiated the first steps to establish the LL process about a month after the outbreak of the war. According to the Directive of the Red Army GS on 27 July 1941, instead of the Military History Department (GS), which had neither the authorities to organize the LL process nor the analysis experts, the entire flow of the LL information was sent to the Operational Department (GS). In April 1942 the Group for using of war (combat) experiences of the Operational Department began to provide final generalised analysis of the lessons learned and their dissemination within the Red Army (Obobshchennye boevoego opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i sil Flota. 2015, s. 696).

To improve the collecting of observations, the Directive of the Red Army GS on 12 January 1942 clearly defined the lessons learned list of urgent reports (LL LUR), format of reports of analysis of combat operations and timing of their submission from armies and fronts to the GS (immediately after the end of operations). Subsequently, the Directive of the Red Army GS on 19 August 1942 amended the above LL LUR and the deadlines for reports submission: to army HQ – no later than 3 days; to front HQ – no later than 5 days; to the GS – no later than 10 days after the end of operations (Obobshchennye boevoego opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 704).

In the fall of 1942, the inspections in the troops concluded that the LL process was ineffective and no proper coordination among the LL bodies at the operational and strategic levels. In order to eliminate the shortcomings, the Directive of the Red Army GS No. 1005215 on 9 November 1942 approved the «Instructions for the use of war experience in the troops and headquarters of the Red Army» (LL SOP-1942) and put into effect the «Instructions for keeping a register of combat experience in units and formations». For example, the Directive defined the mandatory monthly and quarterly LL planning, the procedures and deadlines for submitting lessons learned information and analytical materials (LL IAM). These initiatives became the basis for creating a regulatory framework for organizing the LL process in the Red Army (Obobshchennye boevoego opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 704).

By the end of 1943, it became apparent that the Red Army had not built «a centralized LL process for collecting, summarizing, and implementing combat experiences» (Obobshchennye boevoego opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 709). The LL procedures established within the troops were not fully implemented or were completed with low efficiency. The Group for using of war (combat) experiences (GS) did not have real authorities to manage all Red Army’s LL bodies. The staffing of the LL structure in the troops was 75-78%
plans for studying operations were simplified. The LL planning was cancelled, and monthly LL plans and experiences (Red Army GS) was significantly authority of the Group for using of war (combat) and branches of the armed forces. In addition, «the and armies, the commanders of units, formations and branches of the armed forces. In addition, «the authority of the Group for using of war (combat) experiences (Red Army GS) was significantly expanded, specified, and aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the LL process» (Oboshchenie boevoego opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 710). It should be assumed that at the end of 1943, the Red Army had formed the appropriate legal and methodological framework for organizing the semiformal LL process.

Additionally, in the spring of 1944, the quarterly LL planning was cancelled, and monthly LL plans and plans for studying operations were simplified. The LL LUR was adjusted and «instead of voluminous descriptions of combat operations, it was necessary to provide brief operational and tactical conclusions in an arbitrary form» (Oboshchenie boevoego opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 712). A clear distinction was made between military- historical research and LL process, which contributed to the effectiveness of the organisational learning in the Red Army.

Similar to the practice of organisational learning in the Red Army, with the beginning of the ATO in April 2014, one of the priorities of the UAF leadership was to establish the LL process in the ATO zone. In the UAF, in the context of the stagnation of the SLAD (1991–2013), most of the LL procedures inherited from the Soviet Armed Forces were actually discontinued, with the exception of the procedures for studying the experiences of using the Ukrainian troops in the international peace support operations (PSO) (Paschuk, Yu. 2021, p. 49). To improve the SLAD’s performance in this area, the Order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine No. 840 on 28 December 2011 enacted the «Instruction on the organisation of participation of national contingents (personnel) of the UAF in the international PSOs» (LL SOP 2011). Besides the localized purpose, the LL SOP 2011 did not contain the concept of LL process, the format of LL reporting documents and the formal procedures for LL implementing and sharing. As a result, until August 2014 the LL process in the UAF was chaotic and uncoordinated. Although formally all HQs, SRIs and PMEIs were involved in collecting and/or analysing information on the use of troops in the ATO, none of the UAF command and control bodies, including the MSD (GS), had the proper power to lead this work.

The first step in solving this problem was the enactment of the «Temporary Instruction to heads of military command bodies and commanders of military units on the study, generalization and implementation of the experience of using troops (forces) in the ATO» (LL SOP 2014) by the Directive of the UAF GS on 9 August 2014. The LL SOP 2014 described the general procedures for organizing LL process in the ATO zone and defined the UAF command and control bodies responsible for this activity.

Subsequently, according to the Directive of the UAF GS No. 348/3472 on 30 October 2014, a formal LL LUR was introduced to organize collection, analysis and dissemination of the ATO experiences (Naukovo-doslidna robota, shyfr «Dosvid-A». 2018). Later, according to the Directive of the UAF GS No. 28699/C on 16 December 2014, all LL IAM were to be sent monthly to the COSMTT, which in turn was to generalise these materials and disseminate them to the troops. At the end of January 2016, the Chief of Staff of the ATO approved the «Instruction on the Study and Implementation of the Experiences of Using of Troops (Forces) in the ATO in Donets and Luhans Regions», which clarified the scope and content of the above LL LUR (Naukovo-doslidna robota, shyfr «Dosvid-A». 2018, p. 41).

The results of the inspection of the SLAD’s performance in the ATO zone in June-July 2016 were reflected in the Directive of the UAF GS No. 348/3472 on 25 August 2016. The document included an analysis of the rout causes of the poor SLAD’s performance and the following priority remedial actions (Naukovo-doslidna robota, shyfr «Dosvid-A». 2018):

- to provide commanders of MUs with the opportunity to send the valuable LL information (except classified) directly to the COSMTT, as well as to receive the necessary information in the reverse order,
- introduce «Registers of exchange of combat experience» in all companies (battalion’s and brigade’s HQ), where military personnel can proactively record observations with further weekly (and, if necessary, daily) analysis,
the ATO HQ should develop and issue the weekly LL bulletins, which should be promptly communicated to the UAF personnel, primarily to the servicemen who are in the ATO zone or are being trained to be deployed to the combat areas, expand the use of MLLTs to improve the efficiency of collecting and analysing the LL information.

As a result of the above-mentioned reforms, the SLAD’s performance (Fig. 1) has been significantly improved.

![Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the SLAD’s performance (April 2018)](image)

Thus, during the transformation of both studied organisational learning systems (SLEST and SLAD) in wartime, the relevant LL regulatory framework was created and the semiformal LL processes were implemented in the Red Army and UAF. While for the SLEST such LL process was carried out within the Red Army, in the UAF during the ATO it was performed on a limited scale, mainly in the combat areas (Fig. 1).

**Lessons Learned Training.** The central weaknesses in performance of both systems (SLEST and SLAD) were a poor quality of analysis and information assurance, and a low LL awareness among the personnel ((Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015; Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022). For example, even in the final phase of WWII (Eastern front), «due to the poor quality of reports on the analysis of combat operations submitted to the fronts and General Staff only 15-20% of such materials could be used in official publications» (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 716).

This was primarily due to the lack of appropriate LL training. The Red Army during WWII (Eastern front), as well as the UAF during the ATO, did not organize LL courses to train LL personnel. The military cadets did not receive basic knowledge of organisational learning as part of their professional military education. A national LL course in the UAF was launched only in June 2021 (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022).

**Lessons Learned Tools.** The Red Army during WWII (Eastern front) used the following LL tools:

1) Lessons learned information and analytical materials. Examples of such documents included the monthly LL IAMs developed by the Group for using of war (combat) experiences (GS), as well as other LL reports prepared by HQs at all levels (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 702). An extremely important tool of getting initial observations was the «Register of Combat Operations» kept by military units and formations, starting in late 1942.

2) Printed publications (newsletters, bulletins, guidelines, manuals, handbooks, memos, instructions, etc.) These were «one of the easiest and most affordable ways to disseminate experiences in the Red Army» (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 702).
2015, s. 706). For example, since August 1942, all Red Army commanders received the publications of the «Collection of materials on the study of the war experience» that contained scientific articles on the analysis of combat experiences. 17 issues of this collection (once per 2 months, 8000 copies) were published during the WWII (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 705). In order to quickly disseminate the lessons learned within the troops, the magazine «Military Bulletin» was used. It was published twice a month with a volume of 3 sheets and included «the latest information materials on the combat experience gained in the tactics of using troops» (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 717).

Since the middle of 1943, the printed publications began to include mainly concise information materials instead of huge descriptions of combat operations. Due to the small volume and circulation of these publications, their low efficiency (2-2.5 months from the moment of submitting observations to the moment of printing of the generalised analysis), the number of such publications and their copies was increased. The most «rapid» publication was the Newsletter of the Red Army GS, which was published twice a month since November 1943 with a circulation of 17,000 copies (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 708).

3) Mass media. During WWII the specialized mass media became an important tool in the sharing of the lessons learned and best practices to the mass media became an important tool in the sharing of the lessons learned and best practices to the mass media became an important tool in the sharing of the lessons learned and best practices based on the collective discussion and was recognized in the Red Army as «one of the most effective ways to share experiences». Thus, a universal methodology of analysis of operations was developed by the personnel of the Red Army GS (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015, s. 712).

It should be emphasized that during the ATO the UAF fully utilized the Red Army’s practice of using the above-mentioned LL tools. For example, since September 2016 every MU was required to submit daily reports detailing all combat actions and keep a «Register of exchange of combat experience» in which any soldier could freely write observations about positive and negative experiences (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022). Also, according to the Order of the UAF GS No. 4 on 4 January 2017, the UAF personnel acquired the formal prescribed procedures to perform the after actions reviews, including procedures to analyse combat operations (Propozysii do metodyky vyvchennia ta vprovadzhennia dosvidu v Zbroinykh Sylakh Ukrainy... 2019, s. 81).

On the other hand, the UAF did not implement the achievements of scientific and technological progress in a timely manner. In particular, to analyse and disseminate experiences, the information technologies were implemented too slowly, lagging far behind the leading countries. The armed forces of the NATO member states have used a LL database since 2005, and the NATO LL Portal was launched in 2010 (Naukovo-doslidna robota, shyfr «Dosvid-A». 2018). The UAF planned to create the IELLD in 2014, but this database was launched only in November 2017 (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022). Due to the outdated software and several other technical and procedural limitations, users did not have reliable access to the database, which contained mostly open LL information without proper classification and archiving.

Both in the Red Army during WWII (Eastern front) and in the UAF during the ATO, one of the biggest problems in applying LL tools was the slow dissemination of the LL information. The average time from the moment of submitting observations (reports) about negative or positive experience to the moment of receiving the analysed information by the troops was 2.5-3 months (Obobshchenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015; Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022).

Conclusions. The readiness of both organisational learning systems (SLEST and SLAD) to operate
in wartime was unsatisfactory. In the first phase of WWII, the SLEST in the Red Army was being created and therefore only some SLEST’s components were actually working. At the beginning of the ATO, the SLAD in the UAF was in a ruined state.

The transformation of the organisational learning in the Red Army during WWII (Eastern front) was characterized by the consistent development of the integral SLEST and gradual increase in its effectiveness. At the end of 1943, a unified, centralized LL structure was created at all levels, the legal and methodological foundations for organizing the semiformal LL process were formed, and a wide range of the LL tools was identified and effectively used. The main SLEST’s drawbacks were the poor quality of analysis of observed issues, the lack of procedures to perform remedial actions, and the absence of LL training of the Red Army personnel, especially LL personnel. In general, the creation and functioning of the SLEST in the Red Army was performed in accordance with the requirements of the time using of the LL theory and best practices progressive for the mid-20th century.

Two systems of organisational learning (SLEST and SLAD) had many common features including their purpose to accomplish two main LL functions – analysis and dissemination. In essence, performance of these systems was predominantly aimed to ensure «potential absorptive capacity», to increase the capacity of the Red Army and UAF to absorb knowledge and experiences (Obobshhenie boevogo opita i dovedenie yego do voisk Krasnoi Armii i Sil Flota. 2015; Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022).

The SLAD was partially restored during the ATO after a long stagnation (1991–2014), but its adaptive transformation was mostly localized within the ATO zone. Despite the real threat to the existence of Ukraine as a state, the UAF has been too slow to apply the SLEST’s best practices even despite the time difference (almost 70 years). Besides, the UAF started to apply the modern best LL practices after the end of the ATO, in early 2019. Thus, the SLAD’s performance was rated as poor with achieving only a partial increase in the efficiency of the processes of acquiring and disseminating knowledge (experience), while maintaining a low level of «realized absorptive capacity» (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Yu. 2022).

The relevance of this paper is characterized by the fact that research on identifying the lessons learned best practices during large-scale armed conflicts is currently at an early stage. The results and conclusions obtained are proposed to be used for improving the current Lessons Learned System in the UAF in the context of the ongoing Russian armed aggression.

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ПОРІВНЯЛЬНЕ ВОЄННО-ІСТОРИЧНЕ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ СИСТЕМ ВИВЧЕННЯ, ВПРОВАДЖЕННЯ І ПОШИРЕННЯ ДОСВІДУ У ЗБРОЙНИХ СИЛАХ РАДЯНСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ (ДОБА ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ) ТА ЗБРОЙНИХ СИЛАХ УКРАЇНИ ПІД ЧАС АНТИТЕРОРИСТИЧНОЇ ОПЕРАЦІЇ (2014–2018 рр.)


Актуальність проведеного компаративного воєнно-історичного дослідження зумовлена провідним розголошуванням процесів вивчення та впровадження уроків і передового досвіду у забезпеченні ефективного застосування Збройних Сил України для відбиття російської збройної агресії. Потреба в виконанні науково-практичного завдання визначається недостатньою увагою українських історіографій до досліджень, присвячених вищевказаниму питанню.

Ключові слова: вивчення, впровадження та поширення досвіду, Робітничо-селянська Червона армія, Збройні Сили України, історичний досвід, Друга світова війна, російсько-українська війна.